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Is the Garbage Tax Increase Justified? 
Georgi Angelov 
 
Recently we understood that the Municipality of 
Sofia discusses a possible (and very probable) 
increase of the garbage tax (or garbage fee, as it 
is called). This increase will happen because of 
the proposed growth of the taxable values of the 
real estate which growth will not be fully 
compensated by decrease of the garbage tax rate. 
The justification for this policy is the need of 
more money for cleaning the streets, collection 
of garbage and its transportation and storage (or 
burning). Critics of this policy point out that 
Municipality of Sofia pays more money for 
cleaning and collecting garbage that other 
comparable cities and still the city is not clean 
enough and there is a permanent shortage of 
money for these activities. 
Collection of garbage 
The collection of the garbage in Sofia and the 
other municipalities is financed by the garbage 
tax. Essentially, the garbage tax is a tax on the 
values of the real estate. Therefore, there is no 
connection between the garbage that is disposed 
by the owner of the property and the tax paid by 
him. The collection of the garbage is done by 
companies that have concession contract with 
the municipality of Sofia. Each company has a 
monopoly for collection of the garbage in its 
region.  
We can see several problems with this 
arrangement of the garbage collection: 
• No connection between the disposed 
garbage and the garbage tax paid 
• The garbage tax is set by administrative 
decision 
• The garbage collecting companies are 
selected by administrative decision 
• No competition and existence of a real 
monopoly 
• No incentives for efficiency – because of the 
lack of competition 
What can be done to solve these problems?  
Instead of continuing the current system that 
leads to a constant increase of expenditures, 
some changes in the system can be designed. 
One possible reform is decentralization of the 
garbage collection, which is used in some 
European countries. These are the general 
principles of the decentralized system: 
1. People living in a block of flats (or 
commercial company owning real estate) 
choose the company that will collect their 
garbage. They are free to choose any 
company they want. 
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2. The price for garbage collection is 
negotiated between the garbage collection 
company and the people, living in the block 
of flats (or the company owning the 
building). 
3. The timing of the garbage collection is also 
negotiated between the two sides of the 
contract. 
4. The garbage tax is revoked. 
As a result the garbage collection fee will be 
negotiated and paid on market terms and it will 
depend entirely on the quantity of the garbage 
disposed. The garbage collection companies will 
be many and they will compete which will drive 
prices down to the market levels. Garbage tax 
will disappear. 
Storage and burning of the garbage 
Another problem that requires a lot of 
expenditures is connected with the storage and 
burning of the garbage. A factory for burning the 
garbage must be build and this requires a lot of 
money. One possible solution is to increase the 
property taxes (including garbage tax) in Sofia. 
The other variant is much better – the 
Municipality of Sofia can sell some of its assets 
and increase the efficiency of its expenditures; 
then it can use the proceeds for building the 
required factory. 
There are several possibilities for financing the 
factory: 
• Privatization of “Municipal Bank” and 
“Municipal Insurance Company” 
• Optimization of the administration 
• Privatization of “Sofia Real Estate 
Company” (Sofiiski Imoti) as well as 
buildings, land, offices that are property of 
the municipality 
• Elimination of the useless Municipal 
Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium 
Enterprises 
• Privatization of central heating company, 
city transport, protection company “Egida”, 
hospitals and medical institutions 
• Introduction of competitive public 
procurement for expenditures and ensuring 
full transparency of the municipal spending 
The usage of all these possibilities for financing 
will help avoiding the increase of taxes for 
financing the garbage-burning factory.  
Conclusion 
When public spending is discussed there is a 
constant need for searching for more efficient 
decisions. In the case of Municipality of Sofia 
such solutions are the decentralization of the 
garbage collection and financing the garbage-
burning factory by selling other municipal 
assets. If these two things are done, the result 
will be abolition of the garbage tax and 
ecological (and cheap) destruction of the 
garbage.  
 
 
Social Assistance – For How Long? 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
Social assistance payments are considered as a 
way by which the state can help people who 
cannot receive income by work or possession of 
property. Unfortunately, we are witnessing 
abuse of the system by certain groups in society 
for years. The current law for social assistance 
has numerous requirements and provisions for 
who is entitled to such payments. As well there 
is a separate state agency that administers and 
monitors welfare payments. The law however 
does not stipulate for how long such help can be 
granted. 
What is the result? While unemployment 
benefits have a limitation period according to 
length of service, the welfare payments do not. 
The proposed change by the labor ministry for 
introducing a certain period for receiving 
welfare assistance is a wonderful initiative. The 
planned change however has two major defects. 
First, one of the expected changes is to introduce 
a maximum period for receiving social welfare 
payment of up to 18 months. This means that 
people of working age that receive such social 
payment will have the right to receive them 
longer than unemployed people with the longest 
length of service (over 25 years), because the 
latter are entitled to a maximum of 12 months of 
unemployment benefits according to Social 
Security Code. 
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On the other hand, it appears that one year after 
the social payment is suspended people will be 
able to reacquire it. In reality the change consists 
of termination of participation in the system for 
one year and nothing more or less. This, of 
course, will turn out some of the false 
participants but is not a long-term decision of 
the problem. Most of these people have other 
incomes and can sustain their existence without 
welfare payments. And there is nothing that is 
easier than filing a claim for payment in one 
year time. The knowledge that you will classify 
for social welfare payments after a one-year 
period cannot be compared with the perspective 
of not participating in the system after defined 
cumulative period of time or in the case of 
cheating or misreporting. 
To be truthful we have to say that there are 
certain provisions in the law that are grounds for 
dropping out of the system, i.e. refusal of 
unemployed to participate in programs 
organized and financed by the labor ministry. 
Anyway, such provisions are most often easy to 
avoid, and if applied last for a short time. In 
other words, if you know the system well you 
can take advantage of state’s generosity for 
years (backed by taxpayer’s money). 
What should be done? 
1/ Put into practice one of the basic principles 
laid in the law on social assistance which is 
“Receiving of monthly social welfare payments 
is bounded by expanding socially useful work”. 
2/ Removal of the possible restoration of the 
right to social payments after a defined period of 
time, or if there is such restoration it should be at 
least five years after its imposition. 
3/ Acceleration of the process of transferring the 
responsibility of social support from central 
administration to municipalities. Monitoring and 
control on local level can give amazing results. 
4/ Introduction of a maximum period for social 
payments in one person’s lifespan. Some states 
in the USA have introduced limitation of 60 
months total for social payments per person in 
the course of his life. The results were amazing 
– the claims for assistance dropped 65% and 
stabilized on low level despite rising of 
unemployment in different periods. 
In the end, we can define some basic principles 
that should be implemented if quick and radical 
reform is begun. These principles will optimize 
expenditures, will bring back many of the long-
term “customers” to the labor market and will 
make possible to grant dignifying assistance for 
those who really need it. 
- For those who can work – assistance only 
for work – the motives are both economic 
and practical; 
- Everyone who is applying for social 
assistance should be regarded as able to 
work until all possibilities are exhausted; 
- The assessment of the results of the 
proposed by should be made via comparison 
with those who are employed.  Often, the 
opponents of the proposed system argue that 
social payments will be less than the current 
ones. We can only say that social welfare 
payments should be compared with income 
of one normal working family but not with 
those of the past social assistance system. 
The expected drop out of false recipients 
and their inclusion in the labor market will 
benefit society. 
 
 
Bulgaria and the IMF again 
Dimitar Chobanov 
 
The unofficial visit of Hans Flikenschild, the 
head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
mission to Bulgaria, has ended. During this visit 
discussions with Bulgarian officials were made 
about their policies at the end of 2005 and in 
2006. According to the public information there 
had not been an agreement on some crucial 
issues and further talks are needed. 
According to Mr. Flikenschild, the current 
account deficit (CAD) is a major problem facing 
the Bulgarian economy and should be offset by a 
budget surplus of at least 3% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), which equals around EUR 700 
million.1  The IMF forecasts that the CAD will 
reach 13.8% of GDP in 2005 and if it exceeds 
this limit, it should be accompanied by 
additional budget savings. Along with it 
                                                 
1 According to the forecast in the state budget 
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measures directed toward restricting the credits 
by the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) are taken 
following the IMF recommendations. 
Reducing budget spending is positive and should 
be welcome. However, the attainment of a 
budget surplus means that in the current 
ineffective public spending, which costs too 
much, the government has taken from the 
citizens more money than needed. This 
happened in 2004 when the surplus was around 
1.7% of GDP and will happen in 2005 (the 
provisional surplus at the end of October is 
around EUR 840 million or above 3.9% of 
expected GDP and will probably be around 2% 
of GDP in the year-end). The IMF official insists 
on the same development for 2006. 
This policy of budget surplus is improper as it 
deprives people and companies of their own 
incomes produced by themselves and gives the 
government an opportunity to use the money 
following its purposes, which could be very 
different from the people’s. On the one hand, 
additional money taken restricts consumption, 
which is one the IMF’s targets, while on the 
other it does not allow for some investments that 
could have a positive effect on the production in 
the country. It substantially influences not only 
the demand side, but also the supply side. 
Temporary lower consumption is on account of 
restricted chances for longer-run growth in 
supply. 
Let us consider the dynamics of goods import 
according to latest the BNB data for October 
2005. The analysis, made on annual basis, shows 
that the increase in consumer goods import is 
around EUR 409 million compared to the 
previous period. It constitutes about 13 percent 
of the total increase of imports. Investment 
goods import grows with about EUR 1 012 
million or 32 percent of the total increase, the 
rest due to raw materials (24 percent), mineral 
fuels, oils and electricity (30 percent), and other 
goods (1 percent). As Bulgaria is relatively poor 
in terms of natural resources, its economy needs 
to import them to operate. After the importation, 
the goods are processed and a large share of 
them is used in the production of exported 
goods. For example, the increase in energy 
resources is about EUR 940 million that should 
be put together with the increase in the energy 
export with EUR 405 million, and higher oil 
prices for the period should be taken into 
consideration. 
Therefore, the current account deficit implies 
that the economy works, attracting capitals and 
the total balance of payments measured by the 
change in the foreign currency reserves of the 
country is well above zero. The IMF officials’ 
concern about this is related to the rise in the 
private foreign debt. Reasons for this 
development can be found as a result of the 
application of their recommendations. On the 
one hand, BNB has taken restrictive measures 
against credit growth and on the other hand, the 
government takes more money from companies 
and households. Given the higher economic 
activity at present, demand for credits is directed 
out of the banking system and out of the country 
leading to a rise in foreign debt. 
However, some of the IMF’s advice brings 
benefits to the economy. Cutting budget 
spending, reforming some sectors, and buy-
backs of foreign government debt are 
recommendations that should be followed. 
Reforms in education and the healthcare systems 
are delayed leading to rising ineffectiveness, 
worsening quality of the services’ and higher 
costs. In these circumstances, the teachers’ 
demands for higher wages are an example of 
how one well-organized societal group, knowing 
its interest, can seek rents by the state to increase 
its prosperity at the account of the taxpayers. 
The number of students has decreased due to the 
lower birth rate and emigration but the result is 
not a reduction in number of teachers and 
maintenance costs for education. Higher wages 
should follow a higher quality of education or 
the respective service that is provided. 
One should note the practice of granting a 
thirteenth wage to the budget employees. It is 
completely improper because the source of the 
funds is not the budget itself, but private sector 
employees. They have worked more during the 
year, they have generated more incomes and 
they deserve to be rewarded for their labor and 
entrepreneurship. But this reward is taken away 
coercively through taxes and is given to other 
people whose contribution is very difficult to 
measure. A possible resolution of this case is to 
refund money back to the people by check, a 
practice which is applied in some countries. 
However, this enables the government to realize 
large budget surplus again in the next year, 
which probably will happen in 2006 when the 
revenues will exceed the plan by at least EUR 
500 million. 
A better decision is a reduction of the tax burden 
via the introduction of a 10 percent flat tax on 
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personal income, a 10 percent tax on the 
corporate profit and a 10 percent payroll tax.  
IMF officials would probably disagree but this is 
the way to create more incentives for people and 
companies and to boost the supply side. Tax 
reform should be combined with change in 
education and healthcare, in the judicial system 
and with relief in the business environment. 
Only reforms that expand economic liberty 
enable faster economic sustainable development, 
which is necessary for relatively poor countries 
like Bulgaria. 
The precautionary agreement with the IMF 
expires in the second half of 2006 but this does 
not mean that the cooperation will be ended. It 
will be carried out in changed conditions 
implying weaker influence by the Fund on the 
government and central bank policies. In such 
circumstances, the prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies attain greater importance and the 
implementation institutions should realize that 
the justification with the IMF for some 
inappropriate actions would no longer be 
applicable. 
 
 
On International Investment Climate in 
Bulgaria and Strategies for Attracting 
Foreign Investments 
Adriana Mladenova, Dimitar Chobanov 
 
At the December 7th meeting of the Council for 
Economic Growth a report entitled “Analysis of 
international investment climate and Bulgaria 
foreign direct investment experience and 
opportunity” was presented.  The report was 
introduced by Deloitte Bulgaria and 
commissioned by the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Economics. 
The main conclusions of the report can be 
summarized as follows:   
1. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are a main 
factor for economic growth in Bulgaria as 
they have a direct positive impact on gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the country and 
stimulate opening of new work places and 
transfer of technology innovations, know-
how and management and operational 
knowledge and skills. 
2. According to the analysis, few in number 
but comparatively large investments form 
the volume of the annual FDI flows in 
Bulgaria, which makes the economy 
vulnerable to external economic 
performance and the investment climate 
abroad. The creation of new stimuli is 
necessary for attracting bigger investors in 
the country.      
3. The competitive advantages of the 
Bulgarian economy in attracting FDI are: 
• Natural resources availability 
• Work force –presence of skilled and 
affordable workforce as the average 
wages are low in the country 
• Macroeconomic and political stability 
as a result of NATO membership and 
the prospective EU accession 
4. The disadvantages of the Bulgarian 
economy concerning its ability to attract 
FDI are: 
• Investment climate – the level of the 
administration services is unsatisfactory 
and still lacking enough transparency; 
there are many regulations and 
bureaucratic procedures for starting and 
doing business in the country 
• The internal market in Bulgaria is 
relatively small 
• The country’s location is remote from 
the markets in Central and Western 
Europe and at the same time the 
infrastructure is not fully developed  
5. Three economic sectors are proposed as 
being “targeted industries” and should be 
referred to as priorities in attracting FDI. 
These are: 
• Mechanical and Electrical 
Engineering/Machinery 
• Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) 
• Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) 
6. The strategies for overcoming the 
competitive disadvantages should include 
the following mechanisms: 
• The incentive scheme for investors 
should be reconsidered and the 
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following mechanisms should be 
introduced: more subsidies and grants, 
privilege credits, government 
guarantees for investment credits, 
export guarantees and insurance; 
• There should be a compensation of the 
investors for the disadvantages in 
Bulgaria and the targeted industries 
should be stimulated; 
• Education and training should be 
improved by pre-qualification of the 
unemployed and stimuli for companies 
who improve the qualification of their 
employees and staff. 
Our comments 
Analysis of the FDI as a factor for economic 
growth 
The attraction of foreign investments is the 
result of the advances of the economy and the 
presence of profitable investment opportunities. 
However, a factor for economic growth is not 
the money inflows of FDI, which increase the 
country GDP statistically, but the accumulation 
and creation of capital – physical, human and 
institutional – which leads to enhanced labour 
productivity. Technology renovation and capital 
accumulation in the economy can be financed by 
(1) savings in the economy, that is the 
postponing of present consumption for more in 
the future and (2) attracting savings from foreign 
economies which means attracting of FDI.  
From this point of view, the privatisation of 
government assets is a positive phenomenon as 
long as favourable conditions are being 
established for the development of 
entrepreneurship and efficiently managed 
enterprises while at the same time distribution of 
income by the central government is lessened. 
However, cash flows coming from the sale of 
government enterprises are not a factor for 
economic advance because in these ways 
already existing capital is being bought. Of 
course, the follow-up modernization of the 
enterprises, the adoption of know-how and 
innovation and investments in new technological 
capacity enhance economic growth because they 
lead to the creation of more factors of 
production. Therefore the lack of large 
privatisation deals as a result of the exhaustion 
of assets for privatisation should not be taken as 
a threat for the economy, just the opposite. The 
increase of the private sector share is by itself a 
prerequisite for the attraction of investors and 
doing profitable business in the country.  
The other types of foreign direct investments – 
green field investments and mergers and 
acquisitions are a direct result of the investment 
opportunities that spring up in the country and 
unutilised market niches. Their significance for 
the economy should be evaluated through the 
prism of factors of production and the potential 
opportunities for business in the country.  
Stimulation of FDI Inflow in Bulgaria 
The attraction of investments in Bulgaria should 
not be an end in itself. In particular, non-market 
incentives distort the market signals and lead to 
non-equilibrium in the economy that turns into 
recessions in the middle-run. Optimal utilization 
of the competitive advantages of the economy 
can be accomplished through private initiative, 
voluntary exchange, and observance of property 
rights. Only the free laissez-faire market can 
“determine” which are the most profitable 
industries through coordination between the 
economic actors and via the information signals 
of the prices and the market processes. 
The proposed measures in the report for the 
stimulation of investments in Bulgaria (giving of 
subsidies and all kinds of preferences from the 
government to specified “targeted” industries) 
will have a negative impact on the economy and 
undesirable effects on the business environment. 
Preferences distribution and the lack of equal 
treatment of investors will lead to the following 
results: 
1. Some of the investors will draw back as 
they, not being among the targeted 
industries investors, will not receive equal 
treatment. This creates a certain degree of 
unpredictability in the investment 
environment as a result of the government 
intervention; 
2. Some investors will be attracted to the 
selected industry not for economic reasons 
but as a result of the implementation of the 
proposed incentives. The eyes of some 
businessmen will be redirected from seeking 
of good business ideas to seeking of 
opportunities for preferences (rent-seeking); 
3. The increase of income redistribution and an 
attempt to plan and regulate the 
development path and economic activity in 
the country.        
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4. Resources taken out from taxpayers for 
distribution of grants and privileges have an 
opportunity cost. The missed opportunities 
for economical and cost-efficient utilization 
of the means should be calculated and 
considered as a cost and missed benefits for 
the economy. 
5. Increase of bureaucracy and thus more 
resources will be needed for its maintenance 
and at the same time conditions for 
increased corruption will be established. 
6. The preferred sector is such that the 
government treats it as a priority for the 
sake of the other industries. In fact the 
proposition of several targeted industries 
supposes that the other ones are considered 
non-preferred - and thus their development 
should not be stimulated only because the 
“state” and its consultants think that they are 
not important enough. 
The market is a process of the coordination of 
entrepreneurial efforts to fulfil the needs of 
consumers at most with the scarce resources that 
are available to them. Planning should happen 
only on a firm level and defining of targeted 
industries by the state is a senseless exercise and 
even harmful one when it is followed by 
attempts to change the economic policy in the 
country.    
Measures that should be undertaken in order to 
stimulate foreign direct investments and the 
economic activity in the country should be 
directed towards more economic freedom: 
1. Lowering of the tax and social security 
burden in the economy. 
It is pointed out in the report that Bulgaria 
has one of the lowest tax rates on corporate 
income in Europe (15%) so incentives 
different than fiscal ones should be created 
in order to attract foreign investors. In fact, 
the overall tax and social security burden in 
the country is higher than the direct 
competitors of the state - Romania and 
Croatia. The share of the redistribution of 
income via the government budget (about 
43%) is also among the highest ratios. For 
example, the ratio for Romania is under 
35%. This clearly shows that fiscal 
incentives are one of the fair means for 
equal treatment of the entrepreneurs - 
Bulgarians as well as foreigners.  
A concrete measure that would stimulate 
investment inflows is the introduction of the 
promised zero rate on reinvested income. 
Estonia is already doing well with this fiscal 
incentive. 
2. Decreasing of bureaucratic obstacles and 
implementation of a “single counter“ 
administration, lessening of the licence 
regimes from 39 (their number at present) to 
5. Also, the silent consent principle should 
be well established for all registration 
regimes. The procedures of opening a firm 
should be eased and the whole process 
should become available through the 
Internet.  
3. Privatisation of the state-owned companies 
and other government assets such as forests, 
land, etc.; liberalization of the markets and 
abolishment of all kinds of obstacles on free 
trade.  
4. Reformation in the education system via the 
introduction of vouchers and fostering of 
competition among schools. The proposed 
measures for education improvements in the 
country in the report sound as abstract as 
good wishes but fail to give a full picture of 
the situation and propose a sound solution to 
the existing problems. Through greater 
competition among schools and universities, 
people will become better prepared in the 
sphere of languages learning and will 
become more familiar with new 
technologies and management skills that are 
being evaluated as a prerequisite for FDI 
inflow. Only through the private 
establishment of the supply of education can 
a more reliable connection between schools 
and employers be established. 
It is neither logically based nor economically 
proven that the increase of FDI should become 
for the sake of the local business and as such 
targeted industries cannot be defined for 
attracting investments. Marketing of industries is 
not in the usual scope of government operations 
and the proposed strategy contradicts to the main 
purpose of the state – to protect property rights 
and assure equality among all citizens before the 
law and the legitimately established rules. 
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Inaction In Action: The Court of Auditors, 
European Commissioners, and the Problem 
of Financial Mismanagement 
Kevin Allen 
 
Citing concerns regarding “errors of legality and 
regularity” regarding the accountability of 
community funds, the European Court of 
Auditors refused to sign off on the E.U. budget 
for the 11th consecutive year.  Over the past 
decade, the Court has repeatedly uncovered 
examples of poor accounting practices among 
member states and has recently suggested that 
the underlying cause of these errors is a lack of 
proper implementation and administration of the 
Integrated Administration and Control System 
(IACS) at the national level.  While there is 
some validity to these assertions, the problem is 
a multi-faceted one and it would be remiss to 
assume that fault rests exclusively with actions 
of the member states.  The prevailing problems 
stem not only from the fiscal mismanagement of 
the various member states but from the IACS, 
the Court’s inability to properly measure 
mismanagement and from the actions of the 
Commission itself.  
IACS 
To understand such a contention, it is first 
necessary to understand what the IACS is and 
how it is supposed to work.  Time constraints 
prevent me from offering a comprehensive 
synopsis of the system and as such I will cover 
only the primary components.  The IACS is 
comprised of 5 key elements which when 
implemented properly, will purportedly curb the 
misuse of structural funds.   
The first of these components consists of a 
computerized database whose primary function 
is to record data for each (land) holding.  The 
database is seen as essential for payment 
processing, crosschecking, the application of 
sanctions and management in general.  It can be 
decentralized however it is necessary for 
member states to use compatible systems and the 
reality is that multiple systems are often used 
depending on the structure of the member state2.   
The second component of the IACS is 
comprised of a land parcel identification system.  
                                                 
2 3rd EUROSAI Training Event – Evaluation of 
Internal Control Systems.  Prague, Czech Republic-
2003.   
    www.nku.cz/seminars/Prague_2003/m8.ppt 
Functions of this component include payment 
processing, checking claimed areas, checking for 
duplicate claims for the same parcels and 
carrying out on the spot inspections.  One of the 
primary shortcomings of the parcel identification 
system is that it does not require information 
regarding land usage and the lack of such 
information opens the door for fraudulent 
claims.   
The third focuses on animal identification and 
registration via herd registers and ear tagging.  It 
further adds requirements for the computer 
database and the issuance of animal passports.  
According to the Court, this facet is necessary 
for checking the eligibility of animals claimed, 
checking for duplicate claims, and the 
verification of ownership.   
The fourth component concerns applications for 
aid.  The system stipulates one application per 
farmer while allowing for several animal 
premium applications.  Applications are deemed 
to be essential for the provision of basic 
information on the areas or animals claimed.  
The final element of the system is the integrated 
control system whose functions are to perform 
cross-checks between farmers and land/animal 
claims, to verify the eligibility of claimed areas 
(surface size of parcels, age of animals, etc.) and 
to instill checks to avoid overpayment.    
While there are a number of issues with the 
IACS, the most glaring problems are tied to 
incompatibility amongst databases and the use 
of multiple systems.  The potential for error due 
to incompatibility raises serious concerns 
regarding the effectiveness of the database. The 
problems are exacerbated when animal 
registration and identification is tied to these 
structures.  Furthermore, it is imperative that the 
Court requires claimants to provide information 
regarding land usage.  Intuition dictates that both 
a uniform database system and a comprehensive 
knowledge of applicants are necessary 
precursors to the reduction of fraudulent claims.          
Issues of Measurement 
Other issues correlated with the Court lie in their 
inability to accurately measure fraudulent 
transactions.  The annual report put forth by the 
Court is laden with statements which testify to 
the aforementioned assertion.   
•  Currently the IACS only accounts for 
approximately 63 percent of the Common 
Agricultural Policy budget.  According to the 
Court, CAP expenditures amounting to roughly 
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EUR 43.6 billion have been ‘materially affected 
by errors.’  Looking at these numbers one can 
assume that there are still some EUR 70 billion 
worth of expenditures that have not been 
properly accounted for.  
•  Regarding the reliability of the accounts, the 
Court report notes that ‘in the absence of 
effective internal control procedures for 
miscellaneous revenue and advances, the Court 
cannot be certain that the transactions relating to 
the sundry debtors item have been correctly and 
completely recorded.3’   
•  In respect to sundry debtors, the report 
contends ‘the recording of sundry debtors 
continues to pose problems’ while later adding 
‘..in the absence of a suitable accounting system, 
the Court is unable to give assurance as to the 
accuracy and completeness of the amounts 
entered as held by financial intermediaries.’   
•  In regard to internal policies the Court found 
that despite progress in some areas, there exists a 
number of weaknesses in regard to supervisory 
and control systems as well as errors in 
transactions at the beneficiary level.  It contends 
that such errors will continue unless the legal 
framework is changed in a manner that 
simplifies cost reimbursement systems and 
clarifies procedures governing the different 
programs.   
While it is undoubtedly an onerous affair to 
measure such a large number of transactions, it 
is crucial that the Court be able to accurately 
monitor all financial transfers.  By neglecting to 
reform its own system in lieu of a legislative 
overhaul, the Court is failing to effectively fulfill 
its function and consequently doing a disservice 
to the tax-paying citizens of the E.U.  
Problems concerning the Commission 
As previously mentioned, the Court is not sole at 
fault.  It is necessary for member states to hold 
themselves accountable and ensure that 
community funds are properly spent.  At a recent 
meeting of finance ministers, current president 
Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom rejected 
a request by the Commission that required 
finance ministers of member states to personally 
sign off on their country’s spending.  Such 
irresponsible behavior by leading members of 
the Commission not only contributes to the 
problem but also sets a poor example for both 
newer members and current candidates.  It is 
                                                 
3 European Court of Auditors – 2004 Annual Report. 
absolutely essential that those member states 
that have more experience behave in a fiscally 
ethical manner and unfortunately this has not 
been the case in recent years.   
For example, in 1999, former French prime 
minister and European Commissioner Edith 
Cresson was under investigation for 
misappropriation of E.U. funds after she hired 
Rene Berthelot as a consultant.  In total 
Berthelot received payments of approximately 
BEF 5.5 million despite the fact that his 
qualifications did not correspond to the various 
posts to which he was assigned4.   In the same 
year, allegations of fraud and mismanagement 
led to the resignation of European Commission 
President Jacques Santer and 19 other 
Commissioners.   
The pervasiveness of this financial 
mismanagement can be seen in the 1st Report on 
Allegations Regarding Fraud, Mismanagement 
and Nepotism in the European Commission 
where, in the concluding remarks the report 
states: ‘Undoubted instances of fraud and 
corruption in the Commission have passed 
unnoticed at the level of the Commissioners 
themselves.’    
Conclusion 
In sum, the irregularities mentioned by the Court 
as the reason for failing to sign off on the E.U. 
budget are the function of a variety of 
shortcomings.  Of these shortcomings, the most 
predominant is concerned with the effectiveness 
of the database.  Although the Court places the 
blame squarely on the member states and their 
failure to properly implement the system, one 
can easily see that the root of the 
mismanagement problem runs much deeper.  
The very fact that the Court has failed to sign off 
on the budget for such a lengthy period of time 
leads to questions surrounding its’ ability to curb 
the misuse of E.U. funds.  This is further 
evidenced by the British member of the Court, 
David Bostock, who suggested that the IACS 
had reduced the risk of error for most E.U. 
agricultural expenditures to an acceptable level.  
There is undoubtedly a need for very serious 
reform when EUR 43.6 billion of CAP 
expenditures which have been marked as 
‘materially affected by errors’ constitute an 
acceptable level.   
                                                 
4 1st Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, 
Mismanagement, and Nepotism in the European 
Commission-     March, 1999. 
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Even more disturbing is the lack of 
accountability and responsibility by 
Commissioners at a national level.  Allegations 
of fraud at the highest level of the Commission 
speak to the pervasiveness of the problem while 
the failure to sign off on their own countries 
spending suggests that Commissioners are not 
willing to seriously address the problem.  One 
cannot expect ethical behavior at lower levels of 
the E.U. when the highest-ranking members are 
engaged in corruption and neglect to take 
responsibility for their own unethical conduct.  
This is perhaps best summarized by a comment 
in the 1st Report on Allegations Regarding 
Fraud, Mismanagement, and Nepotism which 
states: ‘Protestations of ignorance on the part of 
Commissioners concerning problems that were 
often common knowledge in their services, even 
up to the highest official levels, are tantamount 
to an admission of a loss of control by political 
authorities over the Administration that they are 
supposedly running.  This loss of control implies 
at the outset a heavy responsibility for both the 
Commissioners individually and the 
Commission as a whole.’ 
Still, there are a number of questions which 
remain unanswered.  Who are the primary actors 
responsible for these losses?  Can we assume 
that member states who receive more funding 
are more likely to lose money in the bureaucratic 
shuffle?  If this is a rational line of thinking then 
the two largest recipients, Germany and France, 
would responsible for the greatest portion of 
mismanaged funds.*  Why is the European 
public not outraged at the fact that such massive 
amounts of money are being wasted and what 
can be done to draw greater attention to the 
problem?  Until the Court of Auditors makes a 
concerted effort to engage in serious and 
comprehensive reform and until members of the 
Commission make a resolute attempt to rectify 
this problem, tax-paying citizens of E.U. 
member states will continue to lose their money 
to self-serving con artists and negligent 
bureaucrats. 
------------ 
* 1 3rd EUROSAI Training Event – Evaluation of 
Internal Control Systems.  Prague, Czech Republic-
2003. www.nku.cz/seminars/Prague_2003/m8.ppt 
 
 
Petition 
to the national governments of the European 
Union member states, the European Council, the 
European Commission and Members of the 
European Parliament 
 
December 1, 2005 
Excise duties are partially harmonised in the 
European Union (EU) – minimum excise 
requirements are set for alcohol, tobacco and 
energy products, and the new EU member states 
have committeed to reach these minimum levels. 
However this task is getting increasingly 
burdensome for the consumers, businesses and 
government institutions of the new member 
states.  
We, the undersigned, state that failures of partial 
excise harmonisation reveal inherent flaws of 
tax harmonisation: societies are prevented from 
having lower taxes, smaller and more efficient 
governments; member states have limited 
opportunities to adapt to their unique social, 
economic and geographic conditions; and 
national governments are shielded from potential 
competition amongst them. Therefore we 
encourage launching an EU-wide debate on the 
reform of the excise tax policy and considering 
an abolition of the minimum level of the excise 
duties.  
Surging fuel prices and smuggling activities 
have disclosed the natural shortcomings of the 
excise tax. There is no agreement whether the 
excise tax is efficient and necessary to 
internalise the negative externalities of 
consumption. The application of excise duties 
itself causes significant negative externalities: 
consumers opt for cheaper and lower- quality 
substitutes, administration of excise duties is 
costly, differences in prices provoke smuggling 
and high excise duties hit the most hard on the 
poorest strata of society. Furthermore, 
availability of smuggled alcohol and tobacco 
substitutes completely undermines the objectives 
of the public health policy.  
Excise duties constitute up to 80 percent of the 
price paid by consumers, thus heavily distorting 
market information about the supply and 
demand as well as long-term prospects and 
needs to adapt to changes in the market. The 
abolition of the minimum level of excise duties 
and the reduction of excise tariffs are long-term 
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measures in order to help the consumer to adapt 
to the changes in the market.   
Harmonization of excise duties fails to attain its 
objectives: differences in prices across EU 
member states remain considerable, a number of 
exceptions for different products are laid down 
in laws, collision of wine-producing countries 
and the remaining member states demonstrates 
the narrowness of the goals set for the excise 
policy, and different tariffs of excise duties 
among member states are tolerated by the EU 
itself as they do not distort the competition and 
the internal market. Minimum levels of excise 
duties were revised before the last EU 
enlargement took place; these levels were 
designed to meet the living and income 
standards in the EU-15 and proved to be too 
burdensome for Central and Eastern European 
countries.  
We believe that it is internal competition and the 
four freedoms, not uniform taxes, create the 
common market. 
High prices of the excised goods and their 
decreasing affordability stimulate smuggling 
into the new EU member states who administer 
the longest part of EU’s external borders with 
poorer EU neighbours, which is a considerable 
incentive for smugglers. Although smuggling 
serves consumers and buffers an increase in 
prices, it creates openings for corruption in the 
customs, the police and other government 
institutions. According to surveys conducted by 
Transparency International, border services of 
Eastern Europe remain exceptionally sensitive to 
corruption despite substantial funding and 
training from EU provided to secure the external 
border of the EU.  
Governments of the EU-15, which have excise 
taxes high above the minimum level, should 
show due attention to the scale and importance 
of the problems faced by the new members of 
the club.    
We urge national governments of the European 
Union, the European Council, the Commission 
and the European Parliament to take necessary 
steps to open debates on the excise tax reform 
and endorse an abolition of the minimum level 
of excise duties as the first need step.  
Respectfully,  
Lithuanian Free market institute 
 
 
 
THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION* 
1. We uphold the values that have always 
defined European civilisation: personal freedom, 
private property, parliamentary democracy and 
the rule of law. 
2. We recognise that the richness of European 
culture lies in diversity, variety and pluralism. 
3. We fear that, in its pursuit of ever-closer 
union, the EU is progressively abandoning these 
values. 
4. We posit a new and better European 
dispensation, in which power is exercised the 
lowest practical level, and in which decisions are 
taken as closely as possible to those they will 
affect. 
5. We acknowledge the special loyalty that 
citizens owe to their nations, and believe that the 
primary democratic unit should be the sovereign 
state. 
6. We support a broad and loose European 
association, in which all European states can 
comfortably participate. 
7. We believe that, within the constant nexus of 
a European free market, states should be free to 
integrate to the extent that they wish, and in such 
combinations as they please. 
8. We want to limit the jurisdiction of 
international institutions to cross-border issues. 
9. We confirm our commitment to the Atlantic 
alliance, and look forward to a world without 
blocs, in which European nations take their 
place as part of the wider Western family. 
10. We pledge ourselves to work, in our home 
countries and in the forums and councils of 
Europe, for the achievement of these goals. 
 
--------------------- 
*Adopted at a meeting of members of the European 
Parliament and representatives of free market think 
tank, held in Brussels, on December 5 and 6, 2005.  
Two IME associates, Krassen Stanchev and George 
Angelov, took part in the meeting. Enclosed is the FT 
Europe account of the meeting. 
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Rightwingers unite in bid to clip Brussels' 
wings 
By Andrew Bounds in Brussels  
Published: December 7 2005 02:00 
Europe's rightwing politicians, led by members 
of the Conservative party, launched a 
transnational movement yesterday in favour of 
reducing the European Union to a loose 
economic area. 
The move coincides with the election of David 
Cameron as leader of the Conservative party. 
Mr Cameron has pledged to pull his party out of 
the continent-wide integrationist European 
People's party and establish a new eurosceptic 
grouping. 
In Brussels, 18 members of the European 
parliament and about 50 other participants from 
30 countries, including eurosceptics from US 
think-tanks, pledged to support the creation of a 
free market area with powers only over cross-
border issues. 
Daniel Hannan, a Conservative MEP, who 
organised the meeting, said: "There have always 
been people criticising the EU. What there has 
never been is an alliance of people who can 
agree on a mainstream, positive alternative." 
Mr Hannan estimated that up to 70 MEPs could 
join the Alliance for an Open Europe, making it 
the fourth-largest grouping in the European 
parliament. Others believe that is optimistic. The 
parliament has 732 members, and the European 
People's party has 267. 
Many of those attending took part in campaigns 
to oppose the recent European constitution, 
which was defeated by referendums in France 
and the Netherlands. 
Vaclav Klaus, the Czech president and the only 
EU leader to oppose the constitution, was 
chosen to be the "patron" of the alliance. 
"What inspired this is the fact that many parts of 
the constitution are being implemented anyway," 
said Mr Hannan. He cited the EU's fledgling 
diplomatic service and its defence agency as 
examples. 
Yet there are doubts about how many allies Mr 
Hannan can muster. Mr Klaus's ODS party is not 
expected to commit itself until after elections in 
June. 
Poland's governing Law and Justice party sits 
with virulent eurosceptics and has a protectionist 
bent. 
Anthony Nelson, a former Conservative minister 
and chairman of Britain in Europe, the pro-
European pressure group, condemned the 
"isolationist" plan that would reduce British 
influence over regulations. 
Mr Nelson, who is vice-chairman of Citigroup, 
said: "A new Tory leader should occupy the 
centre ground and be inclusive not exclusive. 
Anything that isolates us from Europe cannot 
help, and defend our financial services industry, 
which is vital to our prosperity." 
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